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Abstract
The causal closure of physics is usually discussed in a context free way. Here I dis-
cuss it in the context of engineering systems and biology, where strong emergence
takes place due to a combination of upwards emergence and downwards causation
[Ellis 2020]. Firstly, I show that causal closure is strictly limited in terms of spatial
interactions because these are cases that are of necessity strongly interacting with
the environment. Effective Spatial Closure holds ceteris parabus, and can be vio-
lated by Black Swan Events. Secondly, I show that causal closure in the hierarchy of
emergence is a strictly interlevel affair, and in the cases of engineering and biology
encompasses all levels from the social level to the particle physics level. However
Effective Causal Closure can usefully be defined for a restricted set of levels, and one
can experimentally determine Effective Theories that hold at each level. This does
not however imply those effective theories are causally complete by themselves. In
particular, the particle physics level is not causally complete by itself in the contexts
of solid state physics (because of interlevel wave-particle duality), digital comput-
ers (where algorithms determine outcomes), or biology (because of time dependent
constraints). Furthermore Inextricably Intertwined Levels occur in all these contexts.
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2
1 The Context
It is often supposed that causal closure occurs at the micro level in physical systems, and
hence prevents the occurrence of strong emergence because the macrostate supervenes
on the microstate [Kim 1998] [Kim 1999]. This is discussed in [Clayton and Davies 2006]
[Hohwy and Kallestrup 2008] [Macdonald and Macdonald 2010] and [Gibb et al 2019]. In
contrast, [Butterfield 2011] shows by careful philosophical argument that
“One can have emergence with reduction, as well as without it; and emergence
without supervenience, as well as with it.”
Here I want to examine the issue in a different way, by dealing in some detail with the
hierarchical nature of emergence in real world contexts: the cases of engineering, based
in the underlying solid state physics, and biology, based in the underlying molecular bi-
ology, in turn based in the underlying physics. The context is my paper [Ellis 2020] that
establishes that strong emergence does indeed take place in both those cases, so that the
argument against strong emergence has to be wrong in those contexts.
[Ellis 2020] examines the issue of strong emergence of properties P of macrodynamics
M out of the underlying microdynamics m in the context of condensed matter physics
and biology. Following Anderson’s lead [Anderson 1972] [Anderson 1994] that symmetry
breaking is at the heart of emergence, its method was to identify five different kinds of
symmetry breaking occurring in different contexts (Section 2.3 of [Ellis 2020]) and then to
trace how broken symmetry states at the macro and micro levels interact with each other.
• The microscale dynamics m, based in the Laws of Physics L, obeys symmetries S:
S(m)=m. Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking SSB(M) leads to symmetry breaking
of the macro scale dynamicsM through the emergence processE wherebyM emerges
from the microscale dynamicsm. This is weak emergence E :m→M : S(M) 6=M.
• This spontaneously broken macro stateM reaches down to create quasiparticles such
as phonons at the micro level, which play a key dynamical role at that level.1 The
base microdynamics m is altered to produce an effective microdynamics m’ which
breaks the symmetry of the underlying physical laws L. Thusm→m’ : S(m’) 6=m.
• To derive correctly the properties of macro dynamics M from the micro dynamical
level, you must coarse grain the effective theory m’ rather than m.
• Thus strong emergence takes place in this case: you cannot even in principle derive
the macrodynamics M from the microdynamics m in a strictly bottom up way,
because m satisfies the symmetry S and M does not.2
As a consequence ([Ellis 2020]:§4.4), in the case of solid state physics, the underlying
microphysicsm cannot be causally complete, because by itself it cannot lead to the emer-
gence of known properties of solids such as electrical conductivity. The lower level physics
only gives the correct outcome when modified by inclusion of terms a(M) arising from
the higher level state M (so S(a) 6= a). The same is true for living systems. That is, in
both these cases, causal completeness is only attained by considering both the low level
properties m and the higher level properties M (which lead to the alteration m → m’)
together. The real causally closed system comprises both those levels.
1See the discussion in Section 6.3 below.
2Unless the coarse-graining operation C breaks the symmetry S: then CS 6= SC.
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The aim of this paper is to extend that result by investigating causal closure of physics
in terms of determining dynamic properties3 P(d) of entities in engineering and biological
contexts (I use the word closure rather than completeness for reasons that become apparent
below as the theme develops). A separate very interesting project would extend this to
considering the dynamic emergence of entities E(d) over time, see e.g. [Carroll 2005].
Section 2 sets the context for the discussion, which is the hierarchies of emergence
in the cases of engineering and the life sciences respectively (Table 1). It introduce the
idea of an Effective Theory ETL at each level L, and discusses bottom up and top down
causation in the hierarchy of emergence (§2.3.
Section 3 introduces the idea of a Domain of Interest (DOI), and the concept of
Effective Spatial Closure (§3.3). It is shown that in terms of spatial interactions, causal
closure in engineering and biology only holds ceteris parabus. Yes of course philosophers
know that this is the case; the point is that it has real consequences in real world contexts.
Section 4 defines Levels of Interest (LOI) and Section 4.4 introduces the need for
Restricted Domains of Interest. Section 5 introduces Interlevel Causal Closure in the case
of biology (§5.3), Section 6 extends this to the case of digital computers.
Section 7 summarizes the main results of this paper, emphasizes that causal closure
need not imply predictability, and comments on ways that people ignore the issues raised
in this paper. An Appendix considers the machine metaphor (Appendix A).
The novel concepts introduced are Effective Theories ETL (Section 2.2), Effective
Spatial Closure (Section 3.3), Levels of Interest (LOI) (Section 4), Effective Causal Closure
(ECC) (Sections 5.3), and Inextricably Intertwined Levels (IIL) (Section 5.4).
2 The Hierarchy of Emergence
The context of the discussion is the hierarchy of emergence. As stated by [Anderson 1972],
“At each level of complexity, entirely new properties appear ... At each stage
entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations are necessary.”
In this section, I present the nature of the hierarchy (§2.1), and comment on Effective
Theories and the Equal Validity of Levels (§2.2. The latter is enabled by a combination
of upward and downward causation (§2.3), with the key feature of multiple realisability of
higher levels in terms of lower level states (§2.4). The crucial relation between Effective
Theories and Causal Closure is briefly commented on in Section 2.5. Going into more
detail as regards the hierarchical structure, it is modular (Section 2.6), with the modules
forming networks (Section 2.7).
2.1 The nature of the hierarchy
The emergent hierarchy is shown in Table 1 for the cases of engineering on the left and
life sciences, in particular the case of humanity, on the right. The left hand side represent
The Sciences of the Artificial as discussed by [Simon 2019]. The right hand side represents
the structures and processes of biology, as discussed by [Campbell and Reece 2005].
3I am using the classification in Section 2.2 of [Ellis 2020].
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Engineering Life Sciences
Level 9 (L9) Environment Environment
Level 8 (L8) Sociology/Economics/Politics Sociology/Economics/Politics
Level 7 (L7) Machines Individuals
Level 6 (L6) Components Organs
Level 5 (L5) Devices Cells
Level 4 (L4) Crystals Biomolecules
Level 3 (L3) Atomic Physics Atomic Physics
Level 2 (L2) Nuclear Physics Nuclear Physics
Level 1 (L1) Particle Physics Particle Physics
Table 1: The emergent hierarchy of structure and causation for engineering (left) and life
sciences (right) (developed from [Ellis 2016] and [Ellis and Drossel 2019]).
This hierarchy has important aspects.
• The bottom three levels L1-L3 are the same on both sides. This is one of the great
discoveries science has made: inanimate matter and living matter are made of the
same stuff at the bottom. Electrons are at level L3, interacting with the nucleus.
• The atomic level L3 is where new properties emerge out of the underlying physics,
as characterised by the Periodic Table of the Elements, another great discovery.
• The components enabling complexity to arise occur at level L4. Both semiconductors
and metals are crystals, and they are the key components of machines.4 Solid State
Physics covers levels L3-L4. Biomolecules such as DNA, RNA, and proteins are the
foundations of biological emergence.
• Level L5 is where the basic units of complexity arise, showing functional emergent
properties, and being the basis for building complex entities. On the machines
side, these are devices such as transistors, light emitting diodes, photodetectors, and
lasers. On the life sciences side, they are cells: the basic building block of life, which
come in many different types. This is the lowest level where the processes of life
occur, entailing metabolism and information processing [Hartwell et al (1999)].
• Level L6 is where on the machine side, devices are integrated into functional units,
such as the Central Processing Unit in a Microprocessor , which is itself a device.
On the life sciences side, organs comprising physiological systems occur.
• Level L7 is where functional units occur that have an integrity of their own: they
are effectively causally closed systems imbedded in a larger environment. On the en-
gineering side, they are machines built to carry out some purpose, such as aircraft or
digital computers or particle colliders. On the life sciences side, they are individuals
with autonomy of action.
• Level L8 is the same on both sides. Both machines and individual human beings
exist in the context of a society with social, economic, and political aspects, which
sets the stage for their existence and functioning.
• Finally, level L9 is again the same on both sides. It reflects the fact that each society
exists in a natural environment with both ecological and geophysical aspects.
4Amorphous materials such as glasses may also occur, but they do not play a key role in the dynamic
emergence of properties P(d) in machines.
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Note that this Table has chosen a particular set of levels to represent causation all the
way from the Particle Physics Level L1 to the Environmental Level L9. However most
scientific studies will be interested in a much more restricted sets of levels: the Levels of
Interest (LOIs) discussed in Section 4. Given such a choice, one will in general use a more
fine-grained set of levels than represented in Table 1. Thus for example if the LOI is
(L4-L6), one might divide that range into a finer set of sublevels.
2.2 Effective Theories and the Equal Validity of Levels
It is a common belief that the lower levels are more real than the higher levels, because
bottom up causation from the lower to higher levels is the source of higher level proper-
ties. Arthur Eddington in On the Nature of the Physical World ([Eddington 1929]:5-12)
muses on the dual (solid macroscopic/atomic microscopic) nature of his writing desk, and
concludes (page 10) that because of the scientific world view,
“The external world of physics has thus become a world of shadows. In remov-
ing our illusions we have removed the substance, for indeed we have seen that
substance is one of our great illusions.”
However this view is subject to dispute. Richard Feynman in his book The Character of
Physical Law ([Feynman 2017]:125-126) considers whether one level or another is more
fundamental, and using a religious metaphor, argues that ‘the fundamental laws are no
nearer to God than emergent laws ’ .5 Phil Anderson arguably had a similar view. Sylvan
Schweber commented as follows [Schweber 1993]:
“Anderson believes in emergent laws. He holds the view that each level has its
own “fundamental” laws and its own ontology. Translated into the language of
particle physicists, Anderson would say each level has its effective Lagrangian
and its set of quasistable particles. In each level the effective Lagrangian - the
“fundamental” description at that level - is the best we can do.
Thus this does not recognize any level as more fundamental than any other.
Recently, Denis Noble has proposed a “Principle of Biological Relativity” [Noble 2012]:
all levels one deals with in studying emergence in biology are equally valid, there is no
privileged level of causation.
Effective Theories A good way to express this is that there is a valid Effective Theory6
(ET) at each level. Elena Castellani gives this definition [Castellani 2002]:
“An effective theory (ET) is a theory which ‘effectively’ captures what is phys-
ically relevant in a given domain, where ‘theory’ is a set of fundamental equa-
tions (or simply some Lagrangian) for describing some entities, their behaviour
and interactions... More precisely, an ET is an appropriate description of the
important (relevant) physics in a given region of the parameter space of the
physical world.
In parallel to the way the functioning of the Laws of Phyiscs was sketched in [Ellis 2020],
one can characterise an Effective Theory ETL valid at some level L as follows;
5This passage is quoted in fulll in [Ellis 2016], pages 454-455.
6Not to be confused with an Effective Field Theory (EFT), see [Castellani 2002], [Burgess 2007],
[Hartmann 2001], which is a special case of an ET. Note that EFTs such as in [Luu and Meißner 2019]
cannot deal with emergence in solid state physics, as they do not allow for symmetry breaking.
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An Effective Theory ETL at a level L is a reliable relation between initial
conditions described by effective variables vL ∈ L and outcomes oL ∈ L:
ETL : vL ∈ L→ ETL[vL] = oL ∈ L (1)
in a reliable way, whether ETL is an exact or statistical law.
It is important to note that an effective theory may have a randomisation element R:
R : vL ∈ L→R(vL) = v
′
L ∈ L (2)
where R might for example produce a Gaussian distribution.
Equal Causal Validity In terms of Effective Theories for emergent properties P(d),
Noble’s principle [Noble 2012] as extended in [Ellis 2020] can be restated:
Equal Causal Validity: Each emergent level L in the hierarchy (char-
acterised as in Table 1) represents an Effective Theory ETL, so each
level is equally valid in a causal sense.
This implies no level is a fundamental level with priority over the others, and partic-
ularly there is not a primary one at the bottom level. This is just as well, because
there is no well-established bottom-most physical level to which physics can be reduced
[Murugan et al 2012]. Every emergent level equally represents an effective theory.7
2.3 Upward and Downward Causation
Equality of validity of effective theories at every level is possible because causation is
not just bottom-up. Rather higher level properties P(d) are linked to lower levels by a
combination of upwards and downwards causation ([Noble 2012], [Ellis 2016], [Ellis 2020]),
which enables emergence of effective laws at each level.
Upwards emergence This has two different aspects ([Ellis 2020]:§1.1).
First there is the Emergence E of a macro system from its components. In terms of
levels, this corresponds to creation of a higher level LN from a lower level Ln: that is,
Ln → LN, N > n. This may lead to topological non-trivial states emerging such as
networks, or Quantum Entanglement may take place . The issue of phase transitions is
important here. First order phase transitions occur when Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking
SSB occurs leading to the emergent level ET having lower symmetries than the underlying
ET. In terms of the associated micro dynamics m and macrodynamics M, if S is the
symmetry set of m, then
{E :m→M, S(m) = M} ⇒ S(M) 6=M. (3)
Second there is emergence P of properties of the emergent level LN out of properties
of the underlying constituent level Ln once LN has come into existence. This corresponds
to emergence of a higher level ETL out of a lower level one. Some form of coarse graining
C of properties may suffice if the higher and lower levels have the same symmetries S, but
not if their symmetries are different due to SSB (see [Ellis 2020]).
7While Luu and Meißner are critical of my claims on emergence [Luu and Meißner 2019], they agree
on this point.
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Downward causation A classification of different types of downward causation was
given in [Ellis 2012], [Ellis 2016]. Here I will rather approach the issue from an ETL
viewpoint. There are essentially two kinds of downwards effects that can happen: down-
ward alteration of lower level dynamics L via either constraints or effective potentials, and
downward alteration of dynamics at level L by altering the set of lower level variables.
Constraints and Effective Potentials The way downward causation by constraints
works is that the outcomes P(d) at Level L depend on constraints CLI at the level L
arising from conditions at a Level of Influence LI. Thus when interlevel interactions are
taken into account, relation (1) is modified (see (30) in [Ellis 2020]) to
ETL(CLI) : vL ∈ L→ ETL(CLI)[vL] = oL ∈ L (4)
Essentially the same holds if the effect of the Level of Influence LI on the level L is
expressed in terms of an effective potential V (vLI) at level L (see (9) in [Ellis 2020]).
The constraints CLI may be time independent: ∂ CLI/∂t = 0 in which case they are
structural constraints; or they may be time dependent: CLI = CLI(t), ∂CLI/∂t 6= 0, in
which case they are signalling or controlling constraints. An important case is feedback
control (engineering), which is essentially the same as homeostasis (biology). Then the
constraints CLI(t) depend on goals GLI valid at level L but set at the Level of Influence
LI. Similarly the potential V (vLI) may depend on time-dependent variables vLI(t) at the
Level of Influence CL. Then ∂vLI(t)/∂t 6= 0⇒ ∂V (vLI)/∂t 6= 0. In both cases the level L
is no longer causally complete on its own; at a minimum, only the combination {L,LI} of
levels can be causally complete.
Altered variables The causal effect due to the level of influence LI may rather be due
to changes in the variables vL at level L due to variables vLI at the higher level LI:
ETL(vLI) : {vL} ∈ L→ ETL(vLI)[vL] = {v
′
L
} ∈ L (5)
where the new set {v′
L
} of effective variables at level L may be smaller, larger, or altered.
They are smaller if they are changed by deleting lower level elements. This occurs when
Downward Causation by Adaptive Selection takes place, altering or deleting selected lower
level elements according to some selection criterion c. This enables alteration of structures
and functions at level L so as to meet new challenges at level LI. This plays an important
role in enabling by organisms to have agency and choice, enabled by stochasticity, as
explained in [Noble and Noble 2018]:
”Choice in the behavior of organisms involves novelty, which may be unpre-
dictable. Yet in retrospect, we can usually provide a rationale for the choice.
A deterministic view of life cannot explain this. The solution to this paradox
is that organisms can harness stochasticity through which they can generate
many possible solutions to environmental challenges. They must then employ
a comparator to find the solution that fits the challenge. What therefore is
unpredictable in prospect can become comprehensible in retrospect. Harnessing
stochastic and/or chaotic processes is essential to the ability of organisms to
have agency and to make choices”
They are larger if for example one has downward creation of quasiparticles such as
phonons via interlevel wave-particle duality ([Ellis 2020] and §6.3), which underlies the
properties of metals and semi-conductors. This is what Carl Gillett calls a “Foundational
Determinative Relation” [Gillett 2019]).
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The are altered if the number is the same but the properties of an element changes.
When they are bound in an emergent complex their own properties may change (for
example, neutrons decay in 11 minutes when free but last for billions of years when bound
in a nucleus), or their interactions with external entities may change (for example electrons
bound in an atom interact with light quite differently than a free electron does).
Downward causation is related to Aristotle’s Formal Cause, see [Tabaczek 2013], but I
will not follow that strand here. To give these rather abstract statements flesh, see many
examples given in [Noble 2008], [Ellis 2016]. Downward causation in relation to the key
physics-chemistry link is discussed in [Luisi 2002].
2.4 Multiple Realisability
Multiple realisability of higher level variables at lower levels plays a key role in downward
causation [Menzies 2003]. Any particular higher level state can be realised in a multiplicity
of ways in terms of lower level states. In an engineering or biological cases, a high level
need determines the high level effective function that needs to be realised and thus the
high level structure that fulfills it. This higher structure and function is then realised by
suitable lower level structures and functions, but there are billions of ways this can happen
It does not matter which of the equivalence class of lower level realisations is used to
fulfill the higher level need, as long as it is indeed fulfilled. Consequently you cannot even
express the dynamics driving what is happening in a sensible way at a lower level.
The issue is not just the huge number lower level entities involved in realising a higher
level systems, as characterised by Avagadro’s Number It is the huge different numbers of
ways combinations of lower level entities can represent a single higher level variable. Any
one of the entire equivalence class at the lower level will do. Thus it is not the individual
variables at the lower level that are the key to what is going on: it is the equivalence
class to which they belong. But that whole equivalence class can be describer by a single
variable at the macro level, so that is the real effective variable in the dynamics that is
going on. This is a kind of interlevel duality:
{vL ∈ L} ⇔ {vi : vi ∈ EL-1(vL-1) ∈ (L-1)} (6)
where EL-1(vL-1) is the equivalence class of variables vL-1 at Level L-1 corresponding to
the one variable vL at Level L. The effective law EFL at Level L for the (possibly vectorial
or matrix) variables vL at that level is equivalent to a law for an entire equivalence class
EL-1(vL-1) of variables at Level L-1. It does not translate into an Effective Law for natural
variables vL-1 per se at Level L-1.
2.5 Effective Theories and Causal Closure
It is important to note the following: one establishes the validity of an ETL for some
chosen level L by doing experiments or making observations on phenomena occurring
at that level. This involves the experimenter intervening at the level L, hence it is an
interlevel interaction. For example a particle physics experiment considers Effective Laws
at level L1 but involves scientists at level L7 and organisations at level L8 acting down to
affect things at level L1. Consequently, one can make the following important observation:
Existence and functioning of Effective Theories ETL at level L does
not necessarily imply causal closure of Level L.
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The issue is what determines constraints C, potentials V , and effective variables v′
LI
that
may occur at that level. They may be influenced by other levels. That is what Sections 5
and 6 are about. Determining an effective law at level L involves other levels then L.
2.6 Modular structure
Looking in more detail at the hierarchy, it is a hierarchy made of modules (this section)
which form networks (next section). It is a modular hierarchy for very good reasons.
Five principles of complex structure ([Booch 2006]:§1.3) gives five principles of
complex structure, developing from [Simon 2019], starting from the idea
“The Role of Decomposition: The technique of mastering complexity has
been known since ancient times: divide et impera (divide and rule)”
The five principles, applicable to both engineering and biology, are stated by him to be,
1. Hierarchic Structure: Frequently, complexity takes the form of a hierarchy, whereby
a complex system is composed of interrelated subsystems that have in turn their own
subsystems, and so on, until some lowest level of elementary components is reached
2. Relative Primitives: The choice of what components in a system are primitive is
relatively arbitrary and is largely up to the discretion of the observer of the system.
3. Separation of Concerns: Intracomponent linkages are generally stronger than
intercomponent linkages. This fact has the effect of separating the high-frequency
dynamics of the components, involving the internal structure of the components,
from the low frequency dynamics, involving interaction among components.
4. Common Patterns Hierarchic systems are usually composed of only a few different
kinds of subsystems in various combinations and arrangements.
5. Stable Intermediate Forms A complex system that works is invariably found to
have evolved from a simple system that worked. . . . A complex system designed
from scratch never works and cannot be patched up to make it work. You have to
start over, beginning with a working simple system.
This underlies existence of levels such that each level is equally causally effective (§2.2).
Booch says “Different objects collaborate with one another through patterns of interaction
that we call mechanisms”. These are what I am calling Effective Theories (ETs). The
objects that collaborate are modules.
Modules Modularity is the property of a system that has been decomposed into a set
of cohesive and loosely coupled modules ([Booch 2006]:56). They can be represented by
Abstractions, where “An abstraction denotes the essential characteristics of an object that
distinguish it from all other kinds of objects and thus provide crisply defined conceptual
boundaries, relative to the perspective of the viewer. An abstraction focuses on the outside
view of an object and so serves to separate an object’s essential behavior from its imple-
mentation.” ([Booch 2006]:44-50). They involve Encapsulation ([Booch 2006]:50-53), that
is, the internal details of the module’s workings are hidden from the external world), and
Multiple realisability: the required module functioning can be fulfilled in many ways by
its internal structure and variables. Hierarchy is a ranking or ordering of abstractions
([Booch 2006]:58).
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2.7 Networks
A feature of particular interest is that emergent systems may give rise to Effective Theories
that involve topological constraints. Indeed this happens quite often because emergent
complexity in both engineering and biology often involves interaction networks, and a key
feature of such networks is their topological connectivity, described by graph theory. Thus
for example Arthur Peacocke points out that
“In electrical circuit theory there are certain topological constraints, the bound-
ary conditions that one element imposes on another ([Peacocke 1990]:74)
They obviously have strongly emergent properties: their functioning does not follow from
any local characteristics of the elements that make up the circuit. The electric light won’t
work until you change its open circuit topology (isomorphic to an open interval) when the
switch is off, to a closed topology (isomorphic to a circle) when the switch is on. This
macro event than reaches done to alter the flow of billions of electrons at the micro level.
Networks can be physical networks, or interaction networks.
Physical Networks Physical networks are embodied in physical links between nodes,
which constrain what interactions can take place by dictating what nodes can interact with
what other nodes. Thus physical networks in fact create interaction networks by constrain-
ing interactions between links. This is the key structure-function relationship of engineer-
ing and biology. Examples in engineering are computer architecture [Tanenbaum 2006],
computer networks [Kurose 2005], and artificial neural networks [Jain et al 1996]. The
case of importance in biology is the nervous system [Guyton 1977] and neural networks
[Haykin 1994].
Interaction Networks Interaction networks occur due to the presence of a variety of
reagents that selectively interact with each other. This requires firstly a container that
keeps the reagents within interaction distance of each other, rather than just diffusing
away, and second the presence of an appropriate set of reagent that do indeed interact
with each other. A key role is then played by selectively letting specific reagents enter or
exit the container so as to control their interaction densities.
On a large scale, examples of importance in engineering are purification plants, chemi-
cal engineering reaction vessels, water treatment plants, sewage treatment plants . In biol-
ogy, they arguably are the endocryne system, controlling signalling, and the digestive system,
controlling metabolism at the systems level [Guyton 1977], and on a larger scale, ecological
networks [Junker and Schreiber 2011].
On a small scale, there are many interaction networks in cell biology [Buchanan et al 2010].
These are crucially dependent on the existence of cells bounded by cell walls, that serve
as the necessary reaction containers. They have ion channels imbedded in those walls
that control movement of ions in and out of the cells, and molecular channels controlling
movement of molecules in and out. They include
• Gene regulatory networks [Carroll 2005] [Wagner 2014] [Junker and Schreiber 2011],
also known as transcription networks [Alon 2019].
• Metabolic networks [Buchanan et al 2010] [Wagner 2014][Junker and Schreiber 2011],
• Cell signalling networks [Berridge 2014] [Buchanan et al 2010]
• Protein interaction networks[Buchanan et al 2010] [Junker and Schreiber 2011]
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• Signal transduction networks [Buchanan et al 2010] [Junker and Schreiber 2011]
These networks are the heart of cell biology [Loewenstein 1999] and underlie how in-
formation flows and logic underlie biological functioning as emphasized by [Nurse 2008]
[Ellis and Kopel 2019] [Davies 2019].
Networks and Hierarchy Networks may have a hierarchical character in that sub-
networks can often be identified within an overall network, and so define levels within
the network [Ravasz et al 2002] [Papin et al 2004] [Wuchty et al 2006].This is an inter-
esting topic I will not develop further here except to remark that firstly, subnetworks
include network motifs [Milo et al 2002] [Alon 2019], which are small subnetworks of par-
ticular functional significance. For example they include the autoregulation motif, which
is nothing other than feedback control ([Alon 2019]:27-40) and the feed-forward loop motif
([Alon 2019]:41-73). They may contain higher-dimensional interactions characterised by
clique complexes [Petri et al 2014]. Networks may also contain hubs, central nodes of im-
portance [Junker and Schreiber 2011]. Their nature is highly dynamic [Deritel et al 2016].
Causation Because interaction networks are directed graphs (i.e. the edges between
nodes have orientations), they represent causal effects, where causation is defined as
[Pearl 2009] [Pearl and Mackenzie 2018]. [Hofmeyer 2018] shows how such diagrams can
be used to exemplify causal entailment in a diverse range of processes: enzyme action,
construction of automata, and ribosomal polypeptide synthesis through the genetic code.
Their causal effects can be tested by experiment, where this is possible (vary conditions
at one node and show that, ceteris parabus (i.e. conditions at other links to the node are
unchanged) this results in a reliable change at another node. When this is not possible,
one can use counterfactual arguments : demonstrating that as a result of the nature of
the network links this should indeed be the outcome if one were to make such a change.
This is the kind of argument I will use to claim that both upward and downward relations
between levels are also causal (Table 3).
Networks and strong emergence Because of their systemic properties, biochemical
networks display strong emergence [Boogerd et al 2005].
3 Domains of Interest (DOI)
In examining the issue of causal closure of properties P(d), one must have the context
clearly in mind. To do so, it is useful to define the Domain of Interest (DOI) of such
study. This has three quite different aspects.
First, there will a specific Topic of Interest (TOI) one wishes to investigate. For
example, it might be physics or engineering or chemistry or biology. In physics, one might
have in mind atomic physics or condensed matter physics or plasma physics; in biology,
molecular biology or physiology or neuroscience or population evolution. Or one might
want to investigate relations between various of these topics.
In this paper, the interest is the nature of causal closure in the relation between physics,
engineering, and biology.
Second, given a choice of topic of interest, the Domain of Interest DOI of a system of
interest S consists firstly of interaction limits for S with its surroundings, and secondly
of time limits on the duration when we are interested in the behaviour of S. Together
these comprise spacetime limitations (Section 3.1), leading to Effectively Isolated Systems
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in the case of physics (Section 3.2) and Effective Spatial Closure in the case of biology and
engineering (Section 3.3).
Thirdly, there will be a choice of Levels of Interest (LOI). The issue of LOIs is the
focus of this paper, and is discussed in the following Section 4).
3.1 Spacetime limitations
To be of physical interest, S must be spatially limited. Although they are often talked
about, systems of infinite extent do not occur in the real universe [Ellis et al 2018].8
Space time boundaries define the time and spatial domain we are interested in in
relation to S. From a spacetime viewpoint, this is a world tube of finite radius R that
surrounds S, large enough to contain S and all the elements strongly interacting with it,
bounded by an initial time ti and final time tf defined in a suitable way. This governs the
kinds of interactions it can have with other systems.
Time limitations We may be interested in short or long timescales characterised by
the starting time ti and ending time tf , depending on what we wish to study. We may be
interested in,
• Evolutionary processes E(d) whereby the family of systems of similar type to S
came into existence over long timescales via reproduction with variation followed by
selection;
• Developmental processes E(d) whereby a specific system S came into existence
through developmental or manufacturing processes, or perhaps by self assembly;
• Functional processes whereby the properties P(d) of the system S considered over
short timescales emerge from the underlying physics. This is the focus of this paper.
Each involves very different choices of the timescale ∆t := tf − ti relevant to our study.
3.2 Effectively isolated systems
Isolated systems Causal closure of a system S cannot happen if uncontrolled influences
arrive from the surroundings:
Sideways influences : {Outside⇒ S} (7)
As these influences vary with time, they will cause changes in the the state of the system
with time that cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the properties of the system alone.
The system is not causally closed.
Physics deals with this by introducing the idea of an Isolated system. This is usually
expressed by giving limits on any incoming influences “at infinity”, for example such
conditions are imposed in studying electromagnetic and gravitational radiation.
However, as just stated, infinity is not a valid physics concept. One should instead
refer to Finite Infinity I [Ellis 2002]: a world tube of finite radius RI >> R chosen so
that incoming radiation and matter will not seriously interfere with S.9 The dynamics
8Except perhaps for the Universe itself; but if this is indeed the case, it is of irrelevance to physics,
because we can neither prove that this is the case or disprove it, and we cannot interact with or be affected
by any regions outside our Particle Horizon [Ellis 2014].
9We cannot shield from neutrinos and gravitational radiation no matter how we choose I, but this
does not matter as their effects are so weak.
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of the system will then be autonomous except for small perturbations due to incoming
matter and radiation crossing I, which can be treated as small effects.
Effectively Isolated Systems (EIS) What we can do is hope to find a
world tube I of finite radius that serves as an effective infinity for
the surface S. The dynamics of S can be treated as an autonomous
system, affected by small incoming perturbations over I.
However, there are two problems with this idea: one to do with physics, and one to do
with engineering and biology.
Causal Domains The first is that famously, in general relativity, causal domains are
determined by null cones rather than timelike tubes [Hawking and Ellis 1973]. Why have
I not defined the causal limits, which are basic in term of causal closure, in terms of null
surfaces rather than a timelike world tube?
The answer is that on astronomical scales, effective causal limits are indeed given by
timelike world tubes rather than null surfaces. On astronomical scales at recent times,
the dynamic effects of radiation are very small compared with those of matter. We get
a very usable I by choosing RI to be about 1 Megaparsec in comoving coordinates
[Ellis and Stoeger 2009]. Nothing outside there has had a significant effect on the his-
tory of our galaxy or the Solar System. Yes some radiation and matter is coming in, but it
is negligible compared to the energies involved in daily life. The one form of radiation of
significance for the world is light from the Sun, which comes from well within those limits:
1 Astronomical Unit might indeed suffice for local physics. The radiative energy coming
from greater distances has negligible dynamical effects on Earth. A timelike world tube
of radius 1AU will do just fine in terms of considering causal closure of the Solar System.
Isolated systems: Laboratories However physics practice works in a different way:
the key concept is an isolated system in a laboratory. It’s a system that is in fact in-
teracting strongly with the the environment (Section 3.3), but that interaction is strictly
controlled so that it is highly predictable. The system is shielded from influences outside
the laboratory as far as possible.This then enables the results of experiments to also be
highly predictable. And that is what enables the determination of the Effective Theories
ETL that hold at a Level L. Examples are the expensive isolation and cooling systems
underlying the success of quantum optics experiments.
Engineering and Biology as Open Systems The real problem is different. It is that
no biological system can be closed: they have by their nature to be open systems. And
the same is true for engineering systems. In these cases, the ‘isolated system’ paradigm is
simply wrong.
3.3 Effective Spatial Closure
Life cannot exist as an isolated system. Biological systems are inherently open systems
interacting with the environment. Arthur Peacocke states ([Peacocke 1990]:10-11),
“Biological organisations can only maintain themselves in existence if there is
a flow of energy and this flow requires that the system not be in equilibrium
and therefore spatially inhomogeneous”.10.
10This is a kind of symmetry breaking different than the cases discussed in [Ellis 2020], and therefore
may, by the same kind of arguments, be related to strong emergence in biology
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The effect of the outside world is not negligible. On the contrary, it is essential to biological
functioning. It cannot be treated as a perturbation. The biosphere experiences incoming
high grade radiation from the Sun and radiates outgoing low grade heat to the dark Sky,
and this is its energy source enabling it to function thermodynamically [Penrose 1990].
Organisms need a flow of material in, and, because of the Second Law of Thermodynamics
(essentially: as time progresses, matter and energy will be transformed from usable to
unusable forms), need to dispose of waste matter and heat resulting from internal non-
equilibrium metabolic processes. A living system S must take in materials and energy
from the surrounding environment E and dispose of waste matter and energy to E:
E→ S→ E. (8)
In summary, living systems are essentially interacting systems. The same is true for
engineering systems, because they do work of some kind.
Reliable Interactions They must therefore interact strongly with an environment that
is stable enough that the interactions with the environment are reliable and reasonably
constant so they do not disrupt the dynamics of the system over time.
In physics this is the concept of a Heath Bath or Thermal reservoir. You are in contact
with an environment but don’t need to take its dynamics into account because it is in a
state usually assumed to be static, characterised only by a constant temperature T ; and
it is so large that the system S has negligible influence on it state.11
Life: Interaction limits How then does one limit those interactions to those that will
enable life to sustain itself? Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela essentially dealt
with this by introducing the idea of Autopoesis [Maturana and Varela 1980], which inter
alia expresses the idea of causal closure in terms of system interaction with its environment.
System Boundaries The key point is how does one define the boundary of a system
in this context. Instead of choosing a spacetime tube of some chosen radius R as in
the astronomy case, one chooses a System Boundary B that characterizes the system as
being effectively autonomous. This underlies the meaning of Level L8 in the hierarchy of
emergence (Table 1, §2.1). A person has a skin that is her physical boundary with the
outside world, but still allows interaction with it. Energy and matter transfer takes place
across the boundary. A machine similarly has a boundary that defines its limits, but will
have some form of energy input enabling it to do work, and in many cases complex cooling
devices to get waste heat out (paradoxically, they may consume large amounts of energy).
But this idea extends down to other levels, for example it holds also at the Device
Level/Cellular Level L5 and the Component Level/Organ Level L6. For example, a cell
is the core of biology. It exists as an entity with its own integrity, characterised by the
cell wall which allows controlled ingress and egress of materials and energy, yet interacts
strongly with the environment.
How then does life handle functioning in this context? The environment must be suffi-
ciently stable so as to allow effective predictability. This is the case when the system is
not causally closed but has predictable interactions with the environment that makes its
own functions predictable. It has an environment that can be treated as predictable up to
11Actually the assumption that ∂T/∂t = 0 is problematic if one wants to explain the arrow of time
[Ellis 2020]; but I’ll leave that aside for the present.
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perturbations. The environment may change with time, but if so, slowly enough to allow
adaptation to the changing situation. This is often the case, and is what on the one hand
allows living systems to flourish, and on the other allows biology to be a genuine scientific
subject [Campbell and Reece 2005].
The exceptions But that is not always the case: take COVID-19 as an example. That
started at the social level (L9) in one house, then spread worldwide via aircraft affecting
life world wide and thereby affecting in a downward way all the biomolecules (L4) and
electrons (L1) in the bodies of doctors and nurses and patients effected. But additionally it
affected the engineering side by closing down thousands of flights across the world, thereby
reaching down to affect all the billions of atoms (L3) and particles (L1) that make up
those aircraft: a classic example of the interlevel causation I turn to next.
As far as predictability is concerned, the system S has reliable interactions with the
environment and so is predictable most of the time, except when we this is not the case.
Predictability holds when all things are equal, but there is no guarantee this will be the
situation. And that is the best we can do.12
Effective Spatial Closure (ESC) Engineering and biological systems
of necessity interact strongly with their environments, because that
is necessary for their functioning. One can in practice usually set up
a situation of Effective Spatial Closure where that interaction is by
and large predictable so that the system will act in a predictable way.
However there is no guarantee that this effective causal closure will
always be as respected by the environment. Effective Spatial Closure
is largely reliable, but holds ceteris parabus.
Elaborating, Investopaedia states this concept as follows:
“Ceteris paribus is a Latin phrase that generally means ‘all other things being
equal.’ In economics, it acts as a shorthand indication of the effect one eco-
nomic variable has on another, provided all other variables remain the same.
... Ceteris paribus assumptions help transform an otherwise deductive social
science into a methodologically positive ‘hard’ science. It creates an imaginary
system of rules and conditions from which economists can pursue a specific
end. Put another way; it helps the economist circumvent human nature and
the problems of limited knowledge’.
In other words, Effective Spatial Closure works except when it doesn’t. Unpredictability
happens when Black Swan Events take place, possible when there is a fat-tailed rather
than a Gaussian distribution [Taleb 2010], and with major significance at the macro level.
And when it doesn’t work, the effects chain all the way down from Level L8 to the atomic
level L3 and particle level L1 in Table 1, as in the case of the Cornovirus pandemic.
4 Levels of Interest (LOI)
Setting this aside, the key conceptual issue I will deal with in this paper is the relation of
the causal closure of emergent properties P(d) to levels in the hierarchy of emergence.
12And no this could not be predicted in principle in a strictly bottom up way if we knew the detailed
positions and momenta of all the particles in our causal past to utmost precision, for multiple reasons
[Ellis 2020] [Ellis 2020a]. These are strongly emergent phenomena, unpredictable even in principle.
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Effective Theories and Existence of Levels is discussed in Section 4.1. Levels of Interest
(LOIs) are defined in Section 4.2. Sensible choices for LOIs are discussed in Section 4.3.
However there is a problem: Interactions span all levels: every LOI interacts with every
other level by both upwards and downwards causation, so how can one get meaningful
LOIs, or indeed a meaningful level? I elaborate on this problem in Section 4.4. A
practical way out is by defining Effective Causal Closure, discussed later in Section 5.3.
The choices one makes relate to whether one wants to answer How questions or Why
questions (Section 4.5).
4.1 Effective Theories and Existence of Levels
An Effective Theory ETL (Section 2.2) is a set of variables and equations represent-
ing interactions and constraints at a particular level L, such that initial data implies a
reliable outcome at that level. It is the possibility of existence of an Effective Theory
ETL (1) at each Level L (the dynamics at that level is determined at that level) that
underlies the very concept of levels in the first place. As commented by Arthur Peacocke
([Peacocke 1990]:10), following from [Simon 2019]
“Natural hierarchies are more often than not ‘nearly decomposable’ - that is, the
interactions among the sub-systems (the ‘parts’) are relatively weak compared
withe the interactions among the subsystems, a property which simplifies there
behaviour and description”
The fact that such levels exist is a consequence of the nature of the underlying physical
laws and the values of the constant of nature [Uzan 2003]. It allows the existence of the
modular hierarchical structures that are the core foundation of complexity (§2.1, §2.6).
4.2 Definition of Levels of Interest LOIs
[Simon 2019]) defines a hierarchical system as follows, quoted in ([Peacocke 1990]:249):
“‘A hierarchical system: A system of composed of inter-related subsystems,
each of the latter being in turn, hierarchical in structure until we reach some
lowest level of elementary subsystem (the choice of this lowest level he regarded
as arbitrary)”.
This is what I have taken for granted above. While it has all the levels shown in Table 1
(§2.1), we usually do not want to consider them all at once. [Blundell 2019] says it thus:
“Thus we take it as a given that when a portion of the universe is selected for
study, be it a gas or a galaxy, we are allowed to blissfully ignore what is going
on at scales that are much larger, or indeed much smaller, than the one we are
considering. ”
That is what I am formalizing by defining the concept of Levels of Interest (LOI). They
are defined as follows:
Levels of Interest (LOIs) is a definition of the range of levels that
will be covered by a theory
A LOI is defined by its top level TL and its bottom level BL, thus
LOI(TL-BL) := {TL ∪BL} (9)
where the Union sign “∪′′ means include all levels between TL and BL. Some studies are
unilevel: TL = BL, and some are explicitly interlevel: TL > BL.
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• One can validly define such a LOI regardless of what levels you choose, because the
levels are equally causally valid (Section 2.2).
• Your choice will depend on your Topic of Interest (TOI) (see §3). It is helpful if the
choice of levels is made explicit, e.g. LOI(3-5) covers levels 3 to 5
• Then one can for the purposes of studying the dynamics at those levels legitimately
ignore higher and lower levels, in the sense to be explored below.
• This is possible because the levels effectively decouple in the sense of allowing valid
Effective Theories ETL at each level L.
• However this does not give you the right to deny the validity of levels that lie outside
your Levels of Interest.
• There is no guarantee that causal completion will occur by including only those levels
characterised by your choice of LOI.
That is the topic of Interlevel Causal Closure, which I discuss below (Section 5).
4.3 Choice of LOIs
Are there limits on the LOIs one can choose? One can choose to investigate any desired
LOIs, not investigating or take for granted the interactions that will inevitably occur from
higher and lower levels. This is done to establish ETLs.
For example Denis Noble in [Noble 2002] “Modeling the heart–from genes to cells to
the whole organ” chooses to investigate the range of levels stated, namely Levels L5 to
L8 in the Hierarchy of Emergence (Table 1), and not for example on the one hand the
interactions between protons and electrons that make this possible, and on the other hand
the mental and social influences that will inevitably be having an effect on how the heart
is functioning. What he does do is investigate the interlevel relations within the levels
LOI(5-8) he has chosen, because that is the domain of physiology.
Other examples are shown in Table 2.
Particle Physics [Oerter 2005] L1
Nuclear Physics ([Hewitt 2015] §33-34) L1-L2
Atomic Physics ([Hewitt 2015] §32) L2-L3
Solid State Physics [Simon 2013] L3-L4
Computer Structure [Tanenbaum 2006] L5-L7
The Molecular Biology of the Gene [Watson et al 2013] L3-L4
The Molecular Biology of the Cell [Alberts 2007] L3-L5
Neuroscience [Kandel et al 2013] L3-L6
Physiology [Randall et al 2002] [Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989] L4-L7
Biology [Campbell and Reece 2005] L4-L8
Major Transitions in Evolution [Smith and Szathmary 1997] L4-L9
Global Climate Change [Houghton 2009] L3-L9
Table 2: Levels of Interest LOIs for various academic disciplines.
Physics right down to Level L1 always underlies what is happening, even if it lies outside
the levels of interest to you. What happens in the real world right down to the physics
levels L1-L3 is always influenced by what happens at higher levels including L9, even if
that is not what interests you in your particular studies.
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What is a sensible DOI depends on conditions.
Choice of Levels of Interest It all depends on what you want to understand.
The suitable choice of LOIs will follow. This is the context within which
“causal completeness of physics” must be evaluated.
4.4 Interactions span all levels
Strongly Interacting Levels There is a basic problem with LOIs, however. That is
the fact that, as mentioned above, every level interacts with every other level! The choices
one makes relates inter alia as to whether one wants to answer How questions, Why
questions, or both (Section 4.5). There is a practical way out that I discuss in Section 5.3
by introducing the idea of Effective Causal Closure.
The Whole Shebang
Table 1 omits two levels. At the bottom, it omits Level L: the level of a Theory of
Everything (TOE). At the top, it omits Level L10: the level of Cosmology.
At the bottom: The TOE and dynamic properties P(d) In order to examine
the emergence of machines on the engineering side and organisms on the biology side, all
one needs is Newton’s Laws of motion, Maxwell’s equations, Galilean gravity, and maybe
the Schro¨dinger equation ([Laughlin and Pines 2000]; §4.1 in [Ellis 2020]). That is, Level
L3 is an adequate base. All engineering and biology emerges from this level, it is the
lowest level engineers and biologists need to study. As explained in [Ellis 2020] and §2.3,
conversely engineering and biology reach down to shape outcomes at Level L3 via time
dependent potentials or constraints.
However Levels L3 and L2 emerge from the Quantum Field Theory and the Standard
Model of Particle Physics at Level L1 [Oerter 2005]. Thus L1 is a deeper foundation
of emergence. However it is essentially decoupled from everyday life [Anderson 1972]
[Laughlin and Pines 2000]. Nevertheless outcomes at Level L1 too must also be shaped
in a downward way by engineering and biological variables, via outcomes at Level L3.
But this is not the bottom. Underlying L1 is some theory of fundamental physics at
Level L0, a “Theory of Everything” (TOE) [Weinberg 1994]: maybe String Theory/M
Theory, maybe not. There are variety of competing theories on offer [Murugan et al 2012].
This is the ultimate source of the emergence of dynamic properties P(d) in engineering
and biology (using the notation in §2.2 of [Ellis 2020])). It affects us every day.
These lie outside the LOIs of engineers and biologists. That is just as well, as we do
not know what the answer is at Level L0, even though it underlies all physical emergence.
As explained above, it suffices to deal with Effective Theories that hold at higher levels.
At the top: Cosmology and Existence E(d) Consider Isaac Newton seeing an apple
drop. This occurs for a variety of reasons: the Law of Gravity acting on the apple, the
light rays that convey this image to his retina, the analysis of the image by his brain,
and so on. But there are far deeper underlying issues. Why does the apple exist? Why
does the Earth exist? Why does the Solar System and the Galaxy exist? Why does the
Universe exist and have the nature it does? These are all the background reasons why the
apple fell, and why Isaac Newton existed for that matter.
These questions of how everything came into being (E(d)) is the domain of Cosmology
[Peter and Uzan 2013] . It deals with issues such as, Where do elements such as Helium and
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Carbon come from? How did the Galaxy, the Sun, and the Earth arise? The Philosophy
of Cosmology [Ellis 2014] considers issues such as Why is physics of such a nature as to
allow life to exist? Particularly: why are the constants of nature [Uzan 2003] of such a
character as to allow the hierarchical structure in Table 1 to emerge? Thus cosmology
affects us every day by underlying our existence.
Everyday effects of cosmology P(d) There are more immediate issues as well, in
the relation of cosmology to everyday life [Ellis 2002]: Why is the Sky dark at night,
serving as a heat sink for the Earth’s waste energy? This is crucial to the functioning of
the biosphere ([Penrose 1990]:411-417). Why is there an arrow of time? [Penrose 1990]
[Davies 2004] [Ellis and Drossel 2020]? This is crucial to all macro level physics, biology,
and chemistry. Both are due to the cosmological context. Thus cosmology affects the
emergence of properties P(d) in engineering and biology today.
The point then is that while it does indeed have a major causal effect on daily life
[Sciama 2012], this is a rock solid relation that does not change with time. It is a fixed
unchanging background that does not alter effective laws as time passes. It is thus not
a case of ceteris parabus13 (c.f.§3.3)´ and so can be taken for granted and not considered
further when investigating causal closure in engineering, biology, and physics.
4.5 How questions and Why questions
An issue in choosing LOIs is if one is interested in How questions or Why questions.
How questions consider physical interactions on the one hand, and mechanisms on
the other. Thus they will relate to levels L1-L7 in Table 1, including L7 because that re-
lates to the integration of systems to produce the organism as a whole [Randall et al 2002]
[Rhoades and Pflanzer 1989].
Why questions relate to motivation, meaning, and philosophical issues. Thus they
will relate to levels L7-L8 in Table 1, including L7 because this is the level where as well
as philosophy, psychology and motivation come in [Donald 2001] [Kandel 2012].
There is of course a trend for some strong reductionists to deny that the Why questions
are valid or have any real meaning. From the viewpoint of this paper, that simply means
that they themselves have a restricted set of LOIs that excludes those higher levels.
Because of the equal validity of levels espoused in [Noble 2012], [Ellis 2020], and in this
paper, that restricted set of interests does not provide a justification for denying the
validity of the levels with Effective Theories outside their particular set of interests.
5 Interlevel Causal Closure: Biology
The crucial concept in this paper is that of Interlevel Causal Closure of properties
P(d). I first consider Causation and Causal Closure (Section 5.1) and the nature of
biology (Section 5.2). Then I consider Interlevel Causal Closure in the case of biology
(Section 5.3), because this is where it is clearest and has been discussed most. I introduce
here the key concept of Effective Causal Closure. A stronger relation is the idea of
Inextricably Intertwined Levels (IILs) which I discuss in Section 5.4.
13Unless we live in a false vacuum in which case local physics could suddenly change in a way that might
wipe out all life [Tegmark and Bostrom 2005].
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5.1 Causation and Causal Closure
Causation In order to consider causal closure, one must first have a view on how one
justifies claims of causal effects P(d). This has been laid out in depth by Judea Pearl in
[Pearl 2009] and [Pearl and Mackenzie 2018]. Causal inference is based in Causal Models
(directed graphs) validated by experimental intervention, or when that is not possible, by
Counterfactual Arguments.
Causal Models Here one consider causal models of the influences at work . In effect,
the diagram of the hierarchy of Levels Table 1 in Section 2 is such a (very simplified)
model, when one introduces the arrows of both upward emergence (left) and downward
constraint or control (right).
BU Engineering Life Sciences TD
Level 9 (L9) Environment Environment ⇓
Level 8 (L8) ⇑ Sociology/Economics/Politics Sociology/Economics/Politics ⇓
Level 7 (L7) ⇑ Machines Individuals ⇓
Level 6 (L6) ⇑ Components Organs ⇓
Level 5 (L5) ⇑ Devices Cells ⇓
Level 4 (L4) ⇑ Crystals Biomolecules ⇓
Level 3 (L3) ⇑ Atomic Physics Atomic Physics ⇓
Level 2 (L2) ⇑ Nuclear Physics Nuclear Physics ⇓
Level 1 (L1) ⇑ Particle Physics Particle Physics
Table 3: The emergent hierarchy of structure and causation for engineering (left) and
life sciences (right), indicating the upward and downward causation occurring.
To develop this approach more fully, one needs to expandTable 3 to a hierarchical diagram
that represents the modular nature of the hierarchy (§2.6). This is a very worthwhile
project, but I will not attempt it here. It is roughly indicated in ([Peacocke 1990]:8-
11,247-248), and examples are in ([Buchanan et al 2010]:6,10-11,22,95,110,132,160).
Intervention Here one actually intervenes at Level LI and reliably observes a resultant
change at level LF. This has been done both for Effective Theories EFL at each level L,
and in many case for both upwards and downwards interlevel effects. One can do this also
using digital computer models; for example [Fink and Noble 2008] [Noble 2012] have done
this to show downwards causation occurring in computer models of heart function.
Counterfactual views [Epstude and Roese 2008] Here one considers what would hap-
pen if one intervened at Level LI, and plausibly argues that this will cause an actual
difference at Level LF, when upward causation takes place: LF > LI (left column BU) or
when downward causation takes place: LI > LF (right column TD). This has been used to
establish that downward causal effects exist, e.g. [Campbell 1974], [Ellis and Kopel 2019],
[Ellis and Drossel 2019].
Causal Closure Consider a multilevel system S (which could have only one level).
Causal Closure of the properties P(d) of a system S(BL-TL) with
a bottom level BL and top level TL occurs when the set of Effec-
tive Laws EFL governing outcomes at each level L, together with the
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upward and downward interactions between levels, are sufficient to
determine the future state o of the system S at all levels {BL-TL}
(the outcome) from an initial state d (the data) given at a set of
levels {LL-HL} with lowest level LL and highest level HL contained
within or equal to {BL-TL}.
Note that this includes the physicalist idea of causal closure where all follows from a single
lowest physical level LL, for that is the case LL = HL, chosen as L1 in Table 1.
Causal Closure requires Effective Predictability on the one hand (Section 3.3), and an
Effectively Causally Closed set of levels on the other, which concept I now consider.
The issue: Two opposing strands
• There are no isolated sets of levels, as just discussed (Section 4.4). Causal Closure
as just defined is an ideal that does not occur in practice unless one takes LL = L1,
HL = L9: you are giving data for the whole thing.
• However there are in practice preferred restricted sets levels with a special integrity
in terms of causal closure (see the comments just after Table 1).
How do we deal with this tension? The clearest domain in which to tackle this is biology
(§5.3). The lessons from there carry over to engineering (§6), including physics (§6.3).
5.2 The nature of biology
Biological organisms have purpose, as stated by Nobel Prize winning biologist Leland
Hartwell and colleagues [Hartwell et al (1999)]:14
“Although living systems obey the laws of physics and chemistry, the notion
of function or purpose differentiates biology from other natural sciences. Or-
ganisms exist to reproduce, whereas, outside religious belief, rocks and stars
have no purpose. Selection for function has produced the living cell, with a
unique set of properties that distinguish it from inanimate systems of interact-
ing molecules. Cells exist far from thermal equilibrium by harvesting energy
from their environment. They are composed of thousands of different types
of molecule. They contain information for their survival and reproduction, in
the form of their DNA. Their interactions with the environment depend in a
byzantine fashion on this information, and the information and the machinery
that interprets it are replicated by reproducing the cell.”
Consequently, as emphasized by Peacock ([Peacocke 1990]:13)
“Many biological concepts and language are often sui generis and not reducible
to physics and chemistry, certainly not in the form to which they apply to
simpler and restricted atomic and molecular systems”.
In the case of biology, unless the concepts considered include purpose and function, it will
miss the essence of what is going on, as pointed out by [Hartwell et al (1999)]. You also
need to introduce the concepts “alive” and “dead”, which do not occur at any lower level
than the cellular level in biology, and do not occur at any physics level. Without this
concept you cannot for example discuss the theory of natural selection [Mayr 2001].
14And see also [Moss and Nicholson 2012].
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Upward and downward causation As just stated, all biological entities have purpose
or function, and that controls in a top-down way what happens at lower levels [Noble 2012]
reaching down to the underlying physical levels [Ellis and Kopel 2019]. The physics does
not control the higher levels, rather - without any violation of the laws of physics - it does
what the biology asks it do. This functioning occurs via a combinations of upwards and
downwards causation [Noble 2008] [Noble 2012], for example gene regulation taking place
on the basis of the state of the heart [Fink and Noble 2008] or the brain [Kandel 2001].
This dynamic reaches down to the molecular level and then the underlying electron level.
The enabling factors are black boxing [Ashby 2013] to get higher level logic out of lower
level logic, together with time dependent constraints at the lower level that are regulated
by higher level biological variables [Ellis and Kopel 2019]. Together they underlies the
emergent effective laws ETL at each level L in biology.
Preferred levels The cellular level L5 is a key level in biology: cells have an organisation
and integrity of their own, and are living integral entities that are the basic units of
life. They interact with other cells at the same level, and react to their environment in
appropriate ways. In multicellular organisms they depend on higher levels for nutrition,
materials, waste disposal, and signals as to what to do. But they can be treated as modules
(§2.6) with an integrity of their own that responds to inputs and produces outputs. The
associated set of biological levels, taking the underlying physics for granted, is the set of
levels L4-L5.
Similarly the level of individual organisms L7 again represents a level of emergent
integrity. Individuals are entities that can be treated as autonomous entities that respond
to environmental cues (from the levels above) and other individuals (at the same level).
The associated set of biological levels, taking the underlying physics for granted, is the set
of levels L4-L7.
So the issue is, how does this kind of autonomy emerge at these particular levels, given
that all levels are interacting?
5.3 Effective Causal Closure in Biology
What characterizes these special sets of levels? The key point as to what occurs is organ-
isational closure in biological organisms [Mossio et al 2009] [Mossio and Moreno 2010]:
“The central aim of this paper consists in arguing that biological organisms
realize a specific kind of causal regime that we call ‘organisational closure’;
i.e., a distinct level of causation, operating in addition to physical laws, gener-
ated by the action of material structures acting as constraints. We argue that
organisational closure constitutes a fundamental property of biological systems
since even its minimal instances are likely to possess at least some of the typical
features of biological organisation as exhibited by more complex organisms.”
This is a distinct causal regime, as explained in [Mossio 2013]:
“In biological systems, closure refers to a holistic feature such that their consti-
tutive processes, operations and transformations (1) depend on each other for
their production and maintenance and (2) collectively contribute to determine
the conditions at which the whole organization can exist. According to several
theoretical biologists, the concept of closure captures one of the central features
of biological organization since it constitutes, as well as evolution by natural
selection, an emergent and distinctively biological causal regime.”
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This is developed further in [Monte´vil and Mossio 2015], identifying biological organisation
as closure of constraints
“We propose a conceptual and formal characterisation of biological organisa-
tion as a closure of constraints. We first establish a distinction between two
causal regimes at work in biological systems: processes, which refer to the whole
set of changes occurring in non-equilibrium open thermodynamic conditions;
and constraints, those entities which, while acting upon the processes, exhibit
some form of conservation (symmetry) at the relevant time scales. We then
argue that, in biological systems, constraints realise closure, i.e. mutual de-
pendence such that they both depend on and contribute to maintaining each
other.”
Thus biological organisation is an interlevel affair, involving downward causation as well
as upwards emergence, thus enabling teleology [Mossio and Bich 2017], [Bich et al 2020].
From the viewpoint of this paper, these authors are identifying specific sets of levels where
effective interlevel causal closure occurs: the topmost level links to the bottom-most level
to close the dynamic loop that leads to biological emergence.
I will quote three more papers that have essentially the same view. [Hofmeyer 2017]
emphasizes this property in the case of the cell:
[The] property of self-fabrication is the most basic expression of biological an-
ticipation and of life itself. Self-fabricating systems must be closed to efficient
causation... I identify the classes of efficient biochemical causes in the cell and
show how they are organized in a hierarchical cycle, the hallmark of a system
closed to efficient causation. Broadly speaking, the three classes of efficient
causes are the enzyme catalysts of covalent metabolic chemistry, the intracellu-
lar milieu that drives the supramolecular processes of chaperone-assisted fold-
ing and self-assembly of polypeptides and nucleic acids into functional catalysts
and transporters, and the membrane transporters that maintain the intracellu-
lar milieu, in particular its electrolyte composition.
You need all these components and levels for the thing to work. [Farnsworth 2018] em-
phasizes that multi-level homeostasis is part of the mix:
Two broad features are jointly necessary for autonomous agency: organisa-
tional closure and the embodiment of an objective-function providing a ‘goal’:
so far only organisms demonstrate both. Organisational closure has been stud-
ied (mostly in abstract), especially as cell autopoiesis and the cybernetic princi-
ples of autonomy, but the role of an internalised ‘goal’ and how it is instantiated
by cell signalling and the functioning of nervous systems has received less at-
tention. Here I add some biological ‘flesh’ to the cybernetic theory and trace
the evolutionary development of step-changes in autonomy: (1) homeostasis
of organisationally closed systems; (2) perception-action systems; (3) action
selection systems; (4) cognitive systems; (5) memory supporting a self-model
able to anticipate and evaluate actions and consequences. Each stage is char-
acterised by the number of nested goal-directed control-loops embodied by the
organism, summarised as will-nestedness.
Finally [Noble and Noble 2019] argue for circular causality:
“We argue that (1) emergent phenomena are real and important; (2) for many
of these, causality in their development and maintenance is necessarily circular;
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(3) the circularity occurs between levels of organization; (4) although the forms
of causation can be different at different levels, there is no privileged level of
causation a priori: the forms and roles of causation are open to experimental
investigation; (5) the upward and downward forms of causation do not occur in
sequence, they occur in parallel (i.e. simultaneously); (6) there is therefore no
privileged direction of emergence - the upper levels constrain the events at the
lower levels just as much as the lower levels are necessary for those upper-level
constraints to exist. Modern biology has confirmed [...] that organisms harness
stochasticity at low levels to generate their functionality. This example shows
in fine detail why higher-level causality can, in many cases, be seen to be more
important than lower-level processes.”
This discussion is related to the idea of Autopoiesis - a system capable of reproducing and
maintaining itself - mentioned above, and to the idea of Autocatalytic sets [Hordijk 2013]
[Hordijk and Steel]. However I will not develop those links here. Rather my purpose is to
claim that exactly the same applies in engineering systems in general, and even in physics
itself, in at least some case. That is what I develop below.
Given that it is understood I am considering causal closure in terms of Levels and
LOIs, I can summarise as follows:15
Effective Causal Closure (ECC) in Biology: We have Effective Causal
Closure of properties P(d) in a biological context when the consid-
ered set of levels {BL-TL} and data {HL-BL} is large enough to
allow causal closure leading to autonomous biological functioning.
It is “Effective” because (i) we know other levels do indeed have
an influence, but can regard those influences as inputs to an au-
tonomous system that do not destroy its autonomy, and (ii) it is a
ceteris parabus relation, as discussed in §3.3. It can be destroyed
by unpredictable Black Swan events [Taleb 2010] that lie outside the
normal operating environment.
Thus this characterizes the set of levels needed for an entity (a cell or an organism) to
function successfully. There is then no preferred level enabling the system to function: they
all equally enable this to happen [Noble and Noble 2019]. [Green and Batterman 2017 ]
argue that in such cases, because the Effective Theories ETL contained in the range
{BL-TL}, one needs different models at each level:
“No single mathematical model can account for behaviors at all spatial and
temporal scales, and the modeler must therefore combine different mathematical
models relying on different boundary conditions”
These are the different ETLs for each level. But note that one then needs data dL for
each level L too. Thus the set of levels where data is given has to be the same as the set
of levels where ECC occurs. That is why in the definition of Causal Closure (§5.1), I have
set {BL-TL} = {LL-HL}. [Green and Batterman 2017 ] give the examples of epithelial
sheets and mechanical modeling of gastrulation.
To be clear: one is free to work with an Effective Theory ETL, with appropriate data
for that level, at any level chosen L in the range {BL-TL}; but one only gets Effective
Causal Closure by including that full set of levels and data.
15This is related to the idea of inter level causal entanglement [Vecchi et al 2019].
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When does this occur in biology? There are two cases where ECC occurs in biology.
• Cells The cellular level is the lowest level showing all the attributes of life. It is a
case of ECC involving Levels L4-L5.
• Individuals The organism level is the major coherent emergent level in life, assum-
ing it is a multicellular organism such as a human being. This is a case of ECC
involving levels L4-L7.
However there is an interesting different view: that human beings are essentially social be-
ings, so that in fact it is a mistake to view them as being capable of living on their own, as is
implied by that categorisation, Thus Berger and Luckmann [Berger and Luckmann 1991]
wrote about the Social Construction of Reality: our worldview - an inescapable part of our
nature shaping our actions - is crucially shaped by the society in which we live. Merlin
Donald’s book A Mind so Rare [Donald 2001] essentially agrees, as does Andy Clark’s
book Supersizing the Mind [Clark 2008]. In short, top-down effects from society so cru-
cially shape our being that they are not just perturbations of independent existence: they
are essential, and that characterisation is wrong. The correct ECC statement is
• Social human beings Human beings are essentially social, and are in fact a case
of ECC involving levels L4-L8.
Ignoring the lower levels A further key comment regards the other end of the scale:
why is it legitimate to ignore levels L1-L3 here? The answer is the existence of quan-
tum and classical protectorates that are governed by emergent rules and are insensitive
to microscopics [Laughlin and Pines 2000]. This is another way of affirming the causal
efficacy of the Effective Theories ETL at each emergent level L. . However the Effectively
Causally Closed levels will reach down to determine what happens at those levels via time
dependent constraints (4) [Ellis and Kopel 2019].
In summary: Interlevel Effective Causal Closure as identified here
is a key feature of biological functioning, emphasized in [Bechtel 2007]
and [Moreno and Mosseo 2015]. As well as being key in terms of
emergence P(d) of properties, it is also key in terms of evolutionary
and developmental processes E(d), see [Carroll 2005] (where it is not
identified as such, but is there) and [Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2012],
where the relation is made explicit.
5.4 Inextricably Intertwined Levels: Biology
A higher level may be essential to a lower level An important possibility is that
the properties P(d) of two levels {BL,TL} may have an essential relationship with each
other: each level cannot function without the other, as in some cases of symbiosis.
Inextricably Intertwined Levels Two levels BL, TL are inextricably
intertwined levels (IIL) if the effective dynamics ETBL, ETTL at each
of the two levels cannot occur without involving the other.
Consider an individual human being. It is no surprise that the level L7 of the individual
cannot exist without the level L5 of cells, for human beings are made out of cells and
depend on them for their existence and physiological functioning. But the fact is that the
converse is also true: the cells cannot exist and function without the existence of the body
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that they comprise. The reason is that cells have specialised for specific functions, and
cannot survive on their own. They are supplied with oxygen laden blood by the lungs,
heart, and indeed the entire circulatory system, without which they die in a matter of
minutes (as happens if a heart attack occurs). Thus levels L5 and L6 are inextricably
intertwined. But organs are part of the individual and won’t function without systemic
integration at that level. Hence levels {L5-L7} are in fact inextricably intertwined.
Now an interesting issue arises: ECC occurs for levels L4-L7. Should I have included
L4 in the inextricably intertwined levels? Certainly Level L4 is required in order that
cells exist at level L5, but is the other way round true also? I believe one can claim it
is, because the gene regulatory networks that control production of proteins at Level L4
is at at Level L5, and they would not exist if it were not for their functioning. Thus the
real inextricably intertwined set of levels is {L4-L7}: the same as the ECC set of levels.
There is however this difference: the ECC relation is ceteris parabus, as explained above.
The IIL relation is not, it is essential, whatever happens at other levels, these levels are
crucially dependent on each other.
6 Interlevel Causal Closure: Digital Computers
The discussion in the last two sections makes clear a set of principles that apply equally
to engineering, and that is what I will show in this section.
To make the discussion concrete, I will consider the case of digital computers. But it
will apply equally to other branches of engineering: automobiles, aircraft, chemical plant,
water supply systems, sewerage systems, and so on.
I consider the nature of digital computers (Section 6.1), where Interlevel Effective
Causal Closure again occurs (Section 6.2). Inextricably Intertwined Levels occur in this
case too (Section 6.3), albeit in a more restricted form.
6.1 Digital computers
The relevant hierarchy [Tanenbaum 2006] [Ellis and Drossel 2019]16 is shown in Table 4.
Level Entity Nature
Level L9 Global Society Global Social and Economic Context
Level L8 Country Social and Economic Context
Level L7 Internet Maximal Network
Level L6 Network Linked computers, printers, file servers
Level L5 Computer Integrated Circuits, I/O devices, Memory devices
Level L4 Integrated circuits ALOE, CPU, Memory, linked by bus
Level L3 Gates Boolean logic: AND, OR, NOT
Level L2 Transistors Binary ON/OFF function
Level L1 Crystalline structure Symmetry, Band Structure
Level L0 Electrons, Ions, Carriers Structure, Current Flow
Table 4: Computer Implementation Hierarchy (schematic). This is the physical con-
text within which upward emergence and downward causation takes place in the case of
digital computers. For a full discussion, see Chapter 2 of [Ellis 2016].
16The labeling of levels is a bit different than in Table 1 and Table 3 because the focus here is
specifically on computers.
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Upward and downward causation The dynamics P(d) of a computer is driven by the
algorithms encoded in the programs loaded, together with the data used by those programs.
These control the flow of electrons through gates at the transistor level via a combinations
of upward and downward causation ([Ellis 2016]:Chapter 2), [Ellis and Drossel 2019]. This
enables the emergent effective laws ETL at each level L. Different algorithms result in
different flows of electrons, as can be demonstrated by running different computer programs
which produce different patterns of electron flows through transistors at Level L2, and
cause major effects at social levels L8 and L9 [MacCormick 2011].
The bigger picture The fact that the higher levels {L8,L9} reach down to affect what
happens at the lower levels {L0-L6} is stated in [Ellis and Drossel 2019] as follows:
Causal closure in the case of computers: In the real world, it is only the
combination of physics with its logical, social, psychological, and engineering
contexts (which includes the values guiding policy) that can be causally com-
plete, because it is this whole that determines what computer programs will
be written and what data utilised, hence what electron flows will take place in
integrated circuits, as per the discussion in this paper
This is in parallel to the interlevel causal closure that takes place in biology, as discussed
in Section 5.3. [Ellis and Drossel 2019] gives a specific example:
“As a specific example: the amount of money that can be dispersed to you from
an ATM will be limited by an agreement you have reached with your bank. The
program used to control the ATM will take into account the existence of such
limits, and the specific amount you are able to take out in a given time period
will be limited by a logical AND operation linking this agreed amount to the
amount of money in your account. Thus these abstract variables will control
electron flows in both the bank computers and the ATM dispenser mechanism.
Every relevant abstract variable has physical counterparts; in other words, it?s
realized by some physical properties on some relevant physical substrate.”
But crucially there is much more than this: there is the whole issue of the purposes
computers are used for in society, from controlling manufacturing to enabling the internet,
cell phones,and social media, and they way that this whole enterprise is shaped by the
values of those that control the system. The book Coders [Thompson 2019] considers “the
morality and politics of code, including its implications for civic life and the economy.
Programmers shape our everyday behavior: When they make something easy to do, we do
more of it. When they make it hard or impossible, we do less of it.” All this is expressed
in the flows of electrons through gates at the digital levels L2-L3.
6.2 Effective Causal Closure in Computers
Nevertheless, just as in the case of biology, Effective Causal Closure can occur when
interlevel causation results in a high degree of autonomy of operation. Analogously to the
case of biology, one can state
Effective Causal Closure (ECC) in Computers: Effective Causal Clo-
sure of properties P(d) in a digital computer occurs when the set of
levels considered are large enough to allow causal closure leading to
autonomous functioning. It is “Effective” because (i) we know other
levels do indeed have an influence, but believe we can regard those
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influences as inputs to an autonomous system that do not destroy
its autonomy, and (ii) it is a ceteris parabus relation, as discussed
in §3.3. It can be destroyed by Black Swan events that lie outside
the normal operating environment.
The two emergent levels with their own causal integrity emerging through ECC are the
integrated circuit level (L4), the equivalent of the cell in biology, with ECC given by
Levels L2-L4; and the computer level (L5), the equivalent of the individual in biology,
with ECC given by levels L2-L5. But just as in the case of biology one can make a case
that one should really include the societal level, the same applies here too. The quotes
above suggest that ECC for computers really only occurs for Levels L2-L9, including the
highest level because of the effect of the World Wide Web.
6.3 Inextricably Intertwined Levels: Computers and Physics
Inextricably Intertwined Levels (IILs) Do these occur in this case too, as they did
in biology? Here there is a major difference: while in biology they link the individual as
a whole to the molecular level, here they also occur, but only at the levels L0-L1.
The reason is that downward emergence of key properties at the electron level L0 takes
place, due to properties of the crystal level L1, as explained in detail in [Ellis 2020]. This is
called a “Foundational Determinative Relation” (FDR) by Carl Gillett, see [Gillett 2019].
In more detail, quasiparticles such as phonons exist due to the broken symmetries of the
emergent lattice structure. They come into being as effective particles at the lower level
L0 because they are dynamically equivalent to collective oscillations of a level L1 structure
(the crystal lattice) ([Simon 2013]:82-83),
This is an essentially quantum theory phenomenon. One can think of it as an interlevel
wave(macro)-particle(micro) duality. [Franklin and Knox 2018] say it this way:
Phonons [are] quasi-particles that have some claim to be emergent, not least
because the way in which they relate to the underlying crystal is almost pre-
cisely analogous to the way in which quantum particles relate to the underlying
quantum field theory.”
Stephen Blundell states the key point thus ([Blundell 2019]:244):
“So now we come to the key question: Are these emergent particles real? From
the perspective of quantum field theory, the answer is a resounding yes. Each of
these particles emerges from a wave-like description in a manner that is entirely
analogous to that of photons. These emergent particles behave like particles:
you can scatter other particles off them. Electrons will scatter off phonons, an
interaction that is involved in superconductivity. Neutrons can be used to study
the dispersion relation of both phonons and magnons using inelastic scattering
techniques. Yes, they are the result of a collective excitation of an underlying
substrate. But so are ‘ordinary’ electrons and photons, which are excitations
of quantum field modes.’ ’
As a consequence, the levels {L0,L1} are inextricably intertwined. This is a proof that
the solid state physics occurring in digital computers is a case where causal closure is
impossible at the micro level L0 alone. It also shows that in general the set of IILs is not
the same as the ECCs.
While these considerations apply to digital computers, of course they also apply in
particular to the solid state physics that underlies their operation.
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7 Conclusion
It is believed by many that because the bottom-most physics level is causally complete,
and only upward causation takes place, higher levels are purely derivative: they have no
real causal validity. In this paper and its companion [Ellis 2020], I argue against that
position. It is invalid because it treats physics in a way that ignores context, whereas
physics outcomes always depend on context. In fact downward effects imply the opposite:
in real world contexts, the bottom-most physics level is not by itself causally complete.
The Contextual Nature of Causal Closure of Physics We can consider physics
per se, or in relation to the natural world, or in relation to biology, or in relation to
engineering. Within physics, the issue of causal closure depends on what aspects we are
considering: Particle Physics, Nuclear Physics, Condensed Matter Physics, Cosmology for
example. Firstly, we have no reliable tested TOE at the very bottom level L0. We don’t
try to reduce to that most fundamental physical level (§4.4). Rather we reduce to a level
that is convenient. That that can work is due to the existence of Quantum Protectorates,
as explained in [Laughlin and Pines 2000].
But then it is common to assume that Level L1 (particle physics) is causally complete.
Is that indeed so? I have argued that this is not the case in the contexts of solid state
physics (Section 6.3); physics and biology (Section 5.3); physics and engineering, as exem-
plified by digital computers (Section 6.2). In each case the real causal closure that takes
laces is an interlevel affair, as emphasized in particular in the case of biology by many
perceptive writers. Effective Causal Closure in real world contexts spans many levels, in
that case reaching down from the effective level of the organism to the underlying physics
via time dependent constraints. This implies how it works in terms of physics in relation
to society. The causal effects of the corona virus pandemic at the social level reach down to
cause major changes at the physical levels L1-L3 through a complex interaction between
social behaviours, virology, and microbiology that for example has temporarily destroyed
international air travel and so the trajectories of the billions of particles that make up
aircraft. Causal closure only occurs when we take all these factors and levels into account.
Considering only disembodied physical laws seriously misleads about the nature of
causation and causal closure in real world contexts. In summary,
Causal closure of physics In the real world context of engineering
and biology, physics at the lowest level considered, whatever that is,
is not by itself causally complete. Interlevel causal closure involv-
ing engineering or biological variables, in those respective cases, is
required in order to have an effectively causally closed system.
This is formalized by the concepts of Effective Causal Closure (Sections 5.3 and 6.2)),
and Inextricably Intertwined Levels (Sections 5.4 and 6.3)). Within solid state physics
itself, the lower levels L1-L3 are not causally closed by themselves because of interlevel
particle-wave duality between the particle level L1 where electrons and phonons live, and
the crystal level L4 where lattice vibrations take place (Section 6.3). Properties of Level
L4 decouple from the lower physics levels. As stated by [Laughlin and Pines 2000],
“The crystalline state is the simplest known example of a quantum protec-
torate, a stable state of matter whose generic low-energy properties are deter-
mined by a higher organizing principle and nothing else.”
In this conclusion, I remark that causal closure does not imply predictability (Section 7.1),
and comment on ways people ignore the issues discussed in this paper (Section 7.2).
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7.1 Causal closure need not imply predictability
Causal closure does not imply predictability, even in the case of physics (whether quantum
or classical).
Quantum Physics Quantum effects doubly cause uncertainty in outcomes.
Firstly, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that the standard deviations of
position σx and momentum σp obeys
σxσp ≥ ~/2 (10)
so one cannot even in principle apply Laplace’s dream of setting initial data precisely.
Consequently, outcomes are also uncertain.
Secondly, collapse of the wave function introduces an irreducible uncertainty in classi-
cal outcomes when interactions take place [Ghirardi (2007)]. This can reach up to macro
levels through various amplifiers such as photon multipliers and CCDs. In the engineering
case it causes predictability issues at macro scales in terms of digital computer reliabil-
ity because cosmic rays cause errors in computer memories [Ziegler and Lanford 1979]
[Gorman et al 1996], and the emission of a cosmic ray by an excited atom is a quantum
event that is unpredictable even in principle. As regards biology, cosmic rays have had a
significant effect on evolutionary history by causing genetic mutations [Percival 1991].
The Classical Case Uncertainty of outcomes occurs in this case too, because one can’t
set initial data to infinite precision [Del Santo and Gisin 2019]. This is an outcome of the
fact that infinity never occurs in physical reality [Ellis et al 2018].
Microbiology In the case of microbiology, interactions take place in the context of
what Hoffmann [Hoffmann 2012] has called “The Molecular Storm”. Molecular machines
use ratchet-like mechanisms to harness energy from that storm, and organisms use it to
provide an ensemble of options from which they can choose preferred lower level states and
so attain biological objectives [Noble and Noble 2018] (see the quote in §2.3). One has the
opposite of the calm relation between initial data and outcomes supposed by Laplace.
7.2 How to ignore the issue
Here are some ways that the nature of causal closure as discussed in this paper is avoided.
Partial reduction This is very common.
Francis Crick in The astonishing hypothesis [Crick 1994] states,
“You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior
of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. ”
In other words, he is reducing L7 to {L5-L4}. Now my physics colleagues who believe
that all that matters is the particle interactions at level L1 will just laugh and say, cells
at Level L4 and molecules at L5 are nothing but particles interacting with each other.
Thus Crick believes in the reality and effectiveness of causality at Levels L4 and L5 that
for example [Hossenfelder 2019] and [Greene 2020], who believe that all causality resides
at Level L1, clearly must deny.
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So why did Crick emphasize causality at those levels? The answer of course is that
that is those were the levels at which he worked - and experienced the effectiveness of
causality in terms of the interactions between entities (molecules, neurons) at those levels.
From a strictly reductionist viewpoint, this is an illegitimate move. It is however
fine if you accept Noble’s Principle of Biological Relativity [Noble 2012], as extended in
[Ellis 2020] and this paper: then causality is real at those levels. But then that removes
your justification for denying the reality of causation at Level L7.
Taking context for granted Sometimes the existence of an important interlevel effect
is so ubiquitous and unchanging that it is not just ignored: it is assumed to not exist
The dominant case where this happen is the existence of an arrow of time, which
does not emerge from the microphysics level L1: it is an outcome of conditions at the
cosmological level L10 [Ellis and Drossel 2020], [Ellis 2020].
The macro result of the existence of a unique arrow of time is known to be true, and
is simply imposed a priori on solutions of the equations, even though it is not implied
by them [Ellis 2020]. This happens for example in rejecting the advanced solutions in
Quantum Field Theory and electrodynamics, and the time reversed solutions in wave
phenomena. The justification is that one is looking for “physically relevant” solutions,
and this ad hoc procedure gives the result one wants, in agreement with experiment, even
though it cannot be justified in a bottom up way. This process is simply taken for granted.
The causal link from Level L10 is hidden.
Ignoring context Crucial contextual effects are simply ignored by some writers e.g.
[Hossenfelder 2019] [Greene 2020]. The view is “You are nothing but a bag of particles,
it’s just a matter of particles interacting via a known set of forces”. Context has nothing to
do with it. The physicists holding this view all come from the particle physics/cosmology
side, where this is to some extent true. Physicists from the solid state physics side (the
largest section of the physics community) do not hold this view, see e.g. [Anderson 1972]
[Simon 2013], because it is not true in those cases [Ellis 2020]. This leads to the large divide
in the physics community between these two groups, as discussed by Sylvan Schweber
[Schweber 1993], and the disdainful epithet “squalid state physics”. In fact solid state
physics is a fascinating endeavour [Anderson 1994].
Denying top-down causation There is a frequent denial of the possibility of top-down
causation, even though it occurs in physics and cosmology. In the latter case it occurs in the
context of primordial nucleosynthesis in the early universe ([Peter and Uzan 2013]:§4.3)
and structure formation in the later universe ([Peter and Uzan 2013]:§5), which are both
dependent on the cosmological context at level L10. That is the reason that primordial
element abundances on the one hand and matter power spectra and Cosmic Background
Radiation angular power spectra on the other can be used to place limits on the background
model parameters [Aghanim et al 2018] (see[Ellis 2016]:275-277).
Top down causation is obvious in biology [Campbell 1974] [Noble 2008] [Ellis 2016]. A
recent example is [Pezzulo and Levin 2016]:
“Top-down approaches focus on system-wide states as causal actors in models
and on the computational (or optimality) principles governing global system
dynamics.”
That paper gives fascinating examples from morphogenesis and regenerative medicine.
There is more to science than particle physics and cosmology.
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A The Machine Metaphor
Another kind of reductionist explanation of biology in general and the brain in particular
is a machine or clockwork metaphor: ‘‘The brain is nothing but a machine’ ’. It is supposed
that when one has explained things in such mechanical terms, this has now proven there
is no function or purpose associated with it, and a reductionist mechanistic explanation
tells everything about it. There is nothing more to say, it has been fully explained. This
viewpoint is in essence the polar opposite of the “Nothing but a bag of particles” view I
discussed above. However there are three issues to take into account.
1. Just like the case of life [Hartwell et al (1999)], the idea of purpose or function
is central to a machine. A clock has been carefully designed and constructed to tell
the time: that is its purpose. A coffee machine has been built to make coffee. A
washing machine has been manufactured to wash clothes. The mechanism has been
designed for that purpose. This is all encompassed in Herbert Simon’s discussion of
The Sciences of the Artificial [Simon 2019]. When mechanisms are in place, a differ-
ent kind of explanation is required than in the case of particle physics or cosmology
[Wright and Bechtel 2007] [Povich and Craver 2017], based in the existence of constraints
[Winning and Bechtel 2018]. Mechanisms require closure of the kind discussed in this
paper (see[Bechtel 2007]).
2. In terms of the coming into existence of machines, they are a case of Purposeful
Design [Ellis 2020]. They would not exist if this were not the case. Thus they are an
example of Strong Emergence E(d) involving an evolutionary process of trying different
designs, modifying them, and selecting those that work best (See Simon and Booch’s
Principle 5 in Section 2.6 above). The outcomes is a machine best suited to purpose
(“My coffee machine is better than yours”). In this way they resemble life [Mayr 2001].
3. Machines are strongly emergent in functional terms P(d). at both micro levels (e.g.
the functioning of a transistor [Ellis and Drossel 2019]) and at macro levels, as in the case
of computers [Tanenbaum 2006], ([Ellis 2016]: Chapter 2).
Although machines have many similarities to life, I am not advocating the view that
life can be regarded as simply a machine. This is of course a major contested issue ever
since machines were invented, and particularly latterly with the advent of the range of
technologies known as Artificial Intelligence. I will just make two relevant comments.
First the functioning of the brain is essentially based on the interaction between intel-
lect and emotions: a complex biological affair [Damasio 2006] [Ellis and Toronchuk 2005].
While this interaction can be simulated, that is very far from bringing affect and qualia into
being. One requires an architecture that allows intentionality [Morgan and Piccinini 2018]
and the causal power of thoughts to come into being [Kandel 1998].
Secondly AI will only succeed in modeling human intelligence adequately when massive
parallel processing is supplemented by the kind of randomness that allows higher levels to
decide which lower level dynamics will lead to the best outcome, as explained by Noble
and Noble on [Noble and Noble 2018] (quoted above in §2.3). Machines must imitate life
in order to behave like life.
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